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Abstract
The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and
policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long‐term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment.
Soft‐governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and pol‐
itics remain surprisingly under‐researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance,
others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither
self‐implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a
new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in
the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysingwhomonitors,
what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key
climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the
Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in
the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy
monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies)
either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article
concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through
the emerging EGD.
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1. Introduction
Policy monitoring (hereafter “monitoring”) may be
understood as “a continuous process of collecting and
analysing data to compare how well a project, program,
or policy is being implemented against expected results”
(OECD‐DAC, 2002, p. 30). Monitoring has long been con‐
sidered a suitable governance tool to enable progress
in turbulent times; that is, in “situations where events
and demands interact in a highly variable, inconsistent,
unexpected, and/or unpredictablemanner” (Ansell et al.,
2017, p. 7; Dobbs et al., 2021). In these volatile policy
environments, monitoring has often been assumed to
generate a steady stream of insights about the direction
of travel and be a basis for policy adjustment (see Rist &
Stame, 2011). Continuous feedback, so the thinking goes,
may enable a more flexible and dynamic form of gover‐
nance commensurate with the demands of turbulence
and its difficult politics. Implicitly, policy monitoring has
thus been viewed as an important ingredient in govern‐
ing “with turbulence” (Dobbs et al., 2021). Existing evi‐
dence suggests that doing so is a long‐standing strategy:
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Nearly 30 years ago, the EU pursued monitoring at the
creation of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, because agree‐
ing on substantial climate policy (such as a carbon tax)
proved impossible (Haigh, 1996). Yamin and Depledge
have consequently identified monitoring and review as
“the backbone of the climate regime” (2004, p. 327).
More than two decades later, the EU found that nego‐
tiating binding emissions targets or even concrete poli‐
cies still proved too contentious for agreement at the
international level, so it once again focused on moni‐
toring and review processes in the negotiation of the
2015 Paris Agreement (Held & Roger, 2018). Article 13
of the Paris Agreement prescribes that all parties to
the agreement must monitor and report on their green‐
house gas emissions and their corresponding climate pol‐
icy efforts to curb emissions. Summing up the key fea‐
tures of the current, Paris‐based governance approach,
Held and Roger argue that “the review process… must
provide accurate information about what states are and
are not doing” (2018, p. 535).
Responding to these international developments, the
EU’s new strategy for governing climate change and the
environment, the European Green Deal (EGD) commu‐
nication (European Commission, 2019), also relies sig‐
nificantly on policy review and monitoring provisions.
For example, on page 3, the document reads that “the
Commission will refocus the European Semester pro‐
cess of macroeconomic coordination (a monitoring and
review system, see Bocquillon et al., 2020) to inte‐
grate theUnitedNations’ sustainable development goals”
(European Commission, 2019, p. 3). Re‐thinking the
European Semester and particularly its indicators has
been highlighted as one of the key issues in implement‐
ing the EGD, especially with a view to the UN Sustainable
Development Goals, but also the EU’s Stability and
Growth Pact (Laurent, 2020). Furthermore, the EGD high‐
lights the member state National Energy and Climate
Plans onpage 6,which also containmonitoring provisions
(Knodt et al., 2020). Furthermore, theGreenDeal commu‐
nication emphasises the need for non‐financial company
reporting (European Commission, 2019, p. 17) and refers
to the better regulation initiative by the Commission
(European Commission, 2019, p. 19), which stresses the
crucial role of policy monitoring and evaluation (Radaelli,
2018). In the context of a new Environmental Action
Programme, there will be “a new monitoring mecha‐
nism to ensure that Europe remains on track to meet
its environmental objectives. The Commission will also
launch a dashboard to monitor progress against all of the
EuropeanGreenDeal objectives” (European Commission,
2019, p. 23). As there is a headline target of reaching
carbon neutrality by mid‐century (if not before) and an
evident prominence of monitoring in the EGD provisions,
what are their prospects for contributing to successful
environment and climate governance?
Given the decades‐long history of monitoring and its
prominence in the EGD, it is striking how little attention
has been paid to it. Scholars have at best scratched the
surface while exploring the characteristics of monitoring
schemes and factors that may foster or hinder successful
monitoring. Some have highlighted the political nature
of related policy evaluation (e.g., Bovens et al., 2006),
but more systematic approaches to investigate monitor‐
ing schemes and the data they produce have only been
undertaken more recently (Bürgin, 2021; De Francesco
et al., 2020; Schoenefeld et al., 2021; Tosun, 2012).While
some publications have centred on the plausibility and
quality of climate monitoring data (Hildén et al., 2014;
Schoenefeld et al., 2018) or aspects of implementing pol‐
icy monitoring (Jones, 2010; Schoenefeld et al., 2019), a
more general framework for analysing the politics of pol‐
icy monitoring is currently missing (see also Schoenefeld
& Rayner, 2019)—even though the theoretical and prac‐
tical importance of monitoring has repeatedly been high‐
lighted (Aldy, 2014, 2018; Cumming & Forbes, 2012;
Peeters & Athanasiadou, 2020).
This article seeks to fill this gap by offering a novel
framework to analyse and understand the politics of
policy monitoring in Section 2. Doing so responds to
a long‐standing misconceptualisation of policy monitor‐
ing as an apolitical means of governing, which has been
admonished time and again but remains a strangely per‐
sistent assumption among many academics and practi‐
tioners (for a discussion of this phenomenon, see Hildén
et al., 2014). Such a limited understanding severely ham‐
pers the conceptualisation and comprehension of the
potential of policy monitoring to governing (with) tur‐
bulence. To propose a better framework for analysing
and understanding monitoring, this article draws on
Lasswell’s (1965) famous definition to unpack the pol‐
itics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors,
what, why, when, and with what effect(s). In intro‐
ducing the framework, this article relates each consti‐
tuting element to extant monitoring schemes, focus‐
ing on energy efficiency and renewable energy poli‐
cies, the broader Monitoring Mechanism in the EU, and
other processes. The Energy Efficiency Directive and
the Renewable Energy Directive are of high relevance
to curbing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, while
the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation aims to gener‐
ate an overview across climate policies in the EU mem‐
ber states (the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation has
now been incorporated in the Energy Union Governance
Regulation [2018/1999], but the underlying monitoring
regime remains intact). Section 3 brings together the
emerging insights and discusses them in the context of
the EGD, which relies in part on monitoring. Doing so
opens numerous avenues for future research and offers
monitoring design choices to practitioners.
2. Analysing Policy Monitoring: Towards a New
Framework
Back in 1965, Lasswell famously wrote that “politics is
the study of who gets what, when and how” (1965, p.
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3). This article draws on Lasswell’s early thinking to pro‐
pose a new framework for analysing the politics of pol‐
icy monitoring schemes. It centres on who monitors,
what, why, when, and with what effect(s). Existing liter‐
ature (e.g., Aldy, 2014; Tosun, 2012) has already begun
to analyse policy monitoring actors and their relation‐
ships (who), monitoring content (what), rationales for
policy monitoring (why), the timing of policy monitoring
(when), and the policy outputs and outcomes of moni‐
toring schemes (effects). However, these elements have
typically been discussed in isolation, generating fragmen‐
tation and a paucity of cumulative insight. The remain‐
der of this section unpacks the proposed framework and
relates each element to existing literature and the EGD
to illustrate their plausibility. Table 1 summarises the
main points of the framework in the context of past expe‐
riences with monitoring energy efficiency and renew‐
able energy policy in the EU, as well as the Monitoring
Mechanism/Energy Union Governance Regulation.
2.1. Who Monitors?
The who question addresses the actors and institutions
that partake in monitoring schemes (Waterman &Wood,
1993). To better understand monitoring actors, the dis‐
tinction between the role of public (i.e., government‐
driven) and private (i.e., society‐driven) policy monitor‐
ing actors has proven useful (Gupta & Mason, 2016).
Many of the advantages and disadvantages of private
and public actors that have been identified in the context
of policy evaluation (see Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017;
Weiss, 1993) also apply to monitoring. For example, pub‐
lic actors may have more resources to finance monitor‐
ing processes (see Mayne & Zapico‐Goñi, 1997). Public
actors may furthermore have better access to relevant
data in monitoring efforts or may be able to steer gov‐
ernments towards generating such data. By contrast,
non‐governmental actors may also command consider‐
able resources and may be more independent than gov‐
ernmental actors, but they may also potentially be inter‐
est driven.
The relationship between those who monitor and
those subjected to monitoring has consequences:
If actors come to understand monitoring processes as
learning opportunities (see Sabel, 1993), they may hap‐
pily provide the relevant data and derive lessons from
them to improve their own policy‐making endeavours.
If policy monitoring becomes a control mechanism to
check compliance against targets or potentially decide
on the (dis)continuation of certain policies, then the
motivation to provide data may be much lower. Tensions
between actors may also emerge because policy moni‐
toring is not free—on the contrary, it requires mone‐
tary and personnel resources (Leeuw, 2010; Mayne &
Zapico‐Goñi, 1997). Conflictsmay thus emerge overmon‐
itoring and reporting’s cost and administrative burden,
as well as the perceived usefulness of the outputs a pol‐
icy monitoring mechanism generates. While monitoring
refers to the processes of regular data collection and
collation, reporting refers to the transfer of data from
one actor to another, often across governance levels.
Data availability also has the potential to shift the power
relations among different agents in governance systems,
potentially impinging on interests (Hughes et al., 2019).
In the cases of energy efficiency and renewable
energy, the EU directives prescribe that the mem‐
ber states report on their policies to the European
Commission. The relationship is hierarchical, with non‐
implementation of monitoring potentially leading to
infringement procedures before the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU). The Monitoring Mechanism
also includes the European Environment Agency as an
implementing actor between the member states and
the Commission. The EEA quality checks the monitor‐
ing data, publicises, and forwards them to the European
Commission, which in turn uses them in its own report‐
ing to the UNFCCC (Schoenefeld et al., 2019). The rela‐
tionship between the actors is similar to the previous
two directives; Luxembourg has already faced the CJEU
twice for untimely reporting (Schoenefeld et al., 2018).
The inclusion of thesemonitoring streams in theNational
Energy and Climate Plans in the Energy Union has shifted
the relationship between the Commission and the mem‐
ber states. In cases of ambition or delivery gaps, the
Commission can act and has therefore strengthened its
hand through monitoring (Knodt & Ringel, 2018).
Non‐state actors also engage in policy monitor‐
ing. A notable example is the Climate Action Tracker
(https://climateactiontracker.org/about), a consortium
that provides a range of data on renewable energy
deployment, efficiency in the building sector and, above
all, greenhouse gas emissions. Doing so yields country
reports and worldwide assessment of climate action
progress. The Climate Action Tracker prides itself in being
independent of governments, whose activities it mon‐
itors, especially with a view to the pledges that coun‐
tries submitted under the Paris Agreement. However, it
should also be noted that the Climate Action Tracker
has received support grants from the German Federal
Government. Taken together, both governments and pri‐
vate initiatives regularly monitor climate policies. This
framework suggests that there is value in exploring mon‐
itoring actors as well as how their interests may shape
the monitoring. This is especially true for the emerg‐
ing design of the EGD, which appears to mainly rely
on government‐driven monitoring, potentially neglect‐
ing the growing ability and role of non‐state actors in pol‐
icy monitoring. However, the EGD monitoring does aim
to link with international efforts through the UN SDGs.
2.2. What Do They Monitor?
The second element of the framework concerns what is
being monitored, typically expressed through the data
that monitoring processes generate. From a concep‐
tual perspective, Dunn (2018) distinguishes between
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monitoring policy inputs (e.g., resources invested), pol‐
icy outputs (e.g., laws on the statute books), and policy
outcomes/impacts (i.e., what is actually being achieved).
There are numerous ways in which monitoring may
be conducted, ranging from “social systems account‐
ing” (i.e., broad, headline indicators such as the unem‐
ployment rate), “policy experimentation” (i.e., the more
or less controlled application of policy approaches to
a sub‐section of the population), “social auditing” (i.e.,
capturing the connection between inputs, outputs and
outcomes of policies), “research and practice synthe‐
sis” (e.g., compiling knowledge from case studies and
research reports), as well as “systematic reviews and
meta‐analyses” (i.e., more systematised analysis of a par‐
ticular research question based on existing studies) that
could all be a basis for monitoring (Dunn, 2018). In other
words, the what question also incorporates important
methodological questions and choices.
Each broad area translates into a plethora of
potential individual indicators (Kenney & Gerst, 2021;
Lehtonen, 2015) that may be used, such as dollars/euros
invested, the numbers of laws on the statute books, or
the level of pollutants in the air. However, not every
monitoring approach is equal; it often tends to be easier
to monitor policy outputs than outcomes. For example,
while taxation, installation, and electricity production
data generally allow for good estimates of the amounts
of solar panels installed in a country, estimating policy
impact on greenhouse gas emissions is more challeng‐
ing, given that doing so involves life cycle analysis of
solar panels, energy substitution behaviour, and so on.
In the area of energy policy, there have, for example,
been endeavours to track the amount of money being
invested in subsidies for nuclear or renewable energy
over time (Küchler &Meyer, 2012). Scholars have further‐
more counted the climate laws that countries have put
Table 1. Analysing policy monitoring in energy efficiency, renewables, and general monitoring of climate policies.
Monitoring Mechanism (now
incorporated in the Energy Union
Case Energy Efficiency Renewable Energy Governance Regulation)
Who Member states collect data and
report them to Commission;
Commission conducts analyses.
Article 7 of the directive requires
that independent authorities
conduct the monitoring (varies by
member state).
Member states collect data and
report them to the Commission.
Member states collect data and
report them to the European
Commission. The European
Environment Agency assists in
the implementation.
What Energy savings.
Mainly projected and/or achieved
(soft language in the directive).
Commission must monitor origins
of biofuels, as well as their
greenhouse gas savings, based on
reports from the member states.
Article 24: Transparency platform






Ex‐ante data mandatory; ex‐post
data voluntary.
Why To track policy developments in the
member states and improve them.
Unclear. To track policy development and
fulfil reporting duties to the
UNFCCC.
When Report every year on the
achievement of the targets
(from 2013).
National Energy Efficiency Action
Plans every 3 years (from 2014).
Every other year (starting in 2011). Every other year (first data
available from 2009).
Greenhouse gases every year.
Effects No assessments available. No assessments available. No assessments available.
Sources Iatridis et al. (2015, 2016);
Kanellakis et al. (2013); Pereira and
da Silva (2017); Ringel (2017);
Rosenow et al. (2015).
Howes (2010); Kanellakis et al.
(2013).
Hildén et al. (2014); Schoenefeld
and Jordan (2020); Schoenefeld
et al. (2018); Schoenefeld et al.
(2019); Schoenefeld et al. (2021).
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into place worldwide (Averchenkova et al., 2017), while
others have tracked private initiatives that address cli‐
mate change (Hsu et al., 2019). Then there have equally
been the considerable efforts under the UNFCCC and
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
to account for the release of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere (Calvo Buendia et al., 2019; Eggleston et al.,
2006), as well as other efforts to track energy flows,
such as coal, oil, or gas (Eurostat, 2016). Conceptually,
Mayne and Zapico‐Goñi (1997) explain that performance
measures should be purpose‐ (rather than data‐ or
practicality‐) driven.
In the area of energy efficiency policy, the EU’s focus
is on energy savings—i.e., policy outcomes. Indicators
here include the cumulative reduction in annual energy
sales in absolute numbers and percentage reductions
as well as, for example, renovation rates for public and
private buildings (expressed in %). Article 24 of the
Energy Efficiency Directive allocates progress monitor‐
ing tasks to the Commission, and details that it must
report to the European Parliament and the Council, and
include the findings in other reporting exercises, such as
the Energy Union reports (Schoenefeld & Knodt, 2021).
The reporting requirements include both retrospective
and prospective elements. Earlier papers have, how‐
ever, admonished that “[a]t present, Member States are
free to decide themselves on the appropriate measur‐
ing and have no obligation to use any harmonised M&V
scheme” (Ringel, 2017, p. 761). For example, in Germany,
the National Statistical Office plays an important role in
collating energy efficiency data, which is mainly gener‐
ated by a public‐private partnership that in turn uses
data from the regional and local administrations (Ringel,
2017). At the European level, this mode of policy moni‐
toring has led to varying levels of data quality, a lack of
transparency of energy‐saving calculation methods, and
incomplete reporting (Rosenow et al., 2015).
The Renewable Energy Directive is equally detailed
in its legal provisions, where for example, Article 7
includes clear prescriptions on how to calculate the
national renewable energy share (a form of standardi‐
sation). However, the reporting requirements are more
general and mainly focus on the share of renewables in
the member states and lists existing and planned poli‐
cies andmeasures to achieve this. Finally, theMonitoring
Mechanism contains per‐policy quantification of pro‐
jected greenhouse gas reductions but minimal ex‐post
data. Over time, the number of indicators has also been
expanded to include information on the costs of policies.
However, much of the additional monitoring remains vol‐
untary, drawing limited member state interest. The mon‐
itoring of state progress through the nationally deter‐
mined contributions (Paris Agreement), as well as mon‐
itoring the steps towards achieving carbon neutrality by
2050, which has recently been enshrined in the EU’s new
climate law, has also further increased the relevance of
monitoring. In the EGD, especially the focus on a “just
transition” will be a key question for monitoring (and
also evaluation). In its current form, the EGD mainly
relies on the European Semester to assess national poli‐
cymaking. But monitoring a just transition may require a
broader range of evidence, including potentially qualita‐
tive aspects, which reach beyond the limited frameworks
that have, for example, featured in EU cohesion policy
(Batterbury, 2006).Whether the dashboard as part of the
new environmental action programme will contain such
considerations remains to be seen.
2.3. Why Do They Monitor?
Both practitioners and academics usually understand
policy monitoring as a means to an end. But to what
end(s)? One reason is to make public policy efforts more
transparent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the
adjective “transparent” as “easily seen through, recog‐
nised, understood, or detected; manifest, evident, obvi‐
ous, clear” and transparency in turn as “the quality or
condition of being transparent.” The core idea behind
the concept of transparency is that knowledge about
the behaviour of others, in turn, changes behaviour
(or policies) or reinforces desirable actions (but there are
also cautionary voices, see Hillebrandt, 2020; Weikmans
et al., 2020). Relatedly, Elinor Ostrom (1990, p. 45)
stresses that “[w]ithoutmonitoring, there canbeno cred‐
ible commitment;without credible commitment, there is
no reason to propose new rules.” In the context of the EU
Energy Union and the Monitoring Mechanism, efforts to
increase the public availability and visibility of the moni‐
toring data have become apparent: Whereas the Energy
Union reports have become a prominent platform to
showcase energy efficiency and renewable energy data
(Schoenefeld & Knodt, 2021), the European Environment
Agency has made concerted efforts to generate online
platforms and a data viewer to increase the visibility of
the data (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2020).
Actors may also engage in policy monitoring because
they face international pressure, or are actively being
monitored by international institutions, such as the
European Commission or the OECD. For example, in the
case of the EU member states, pressure comes from
the Paris Agreement, the Governance Regulation, and
of course the EGD, which demand regular monitoring.
Those who monitor may be interested in actively steer‐
ing or coordinating policy action at lower governance
levels through policy monitoring (Schoenefeld & Rayner,
2019). This ultimately signifies some level of control
being exerted by those who monitor public policies.
However, actors may also monitor because they wish to
learn, perhaps even peer‐to‐peer (see Aldy, 2018; Sabel,
1993). Acquiring new information about one’s own activ‐
ities and those of others can be a source of learning (see
Gerlak et al., 2017).
Just as scholars have stressed regarding policy evalu‐
ation (e.g., Bovens et al., 2006), policy monitoring may
also be conducted for political or tactical reasons that
have less to do with the learning and steering functions
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detailed above. Policy monitoring may be used as a sig‐
nalling tool to set the agenda or hide insufficient policy
action (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2019). In its first attempt
to make a mark on international climate politics, the EU
arguably chose this route and pursuedmonitoring, given
its own inability to agree on a domestic carbon tax (Haigh,
1996; Yamin & Depledge, 2004). As Gupta and Mason
(2016, p. 88) therefore highlight, “disclosure is itself a site
of contestation, rather than a (neutral) means to help
transcend political conflicts.” These political aspects of
monitoring demand attention. So far, the EU has often
sought to depoliticisemonitoring and avoid, for example,
ranking countries to enable naming and shaming, a gen‐
eral approach that the EGD has picked up once again.
2.4. When Do They Monitor?
Mayne and Zapico‐Goñi (1997, p. 18) highlight that use‐
ful performance measures have to be timely. For exam‐
ple, are there dedicated reporting cycles? How often
does policy monitoring happen? And what role does
policy monitoring play in “closing the policy cycle” (see
Mastenbroek et al., 2016)? The timing of policy monitor‐
ing is thus another key factor, especially in relation to
other policy developments. As Puaschunder (2021) high‐
lights with a view to the EGD, policy outcomes will need
to be observed over extended periods to capture their
full effects. Then there is the temporal orientation of
policy monitoring itself: Monitoring data may be either
forward‐looking or prospective (ex‐ante), that is, assess‐
ing future policy impacts, or they may be retrospective
(ex‐post), that is, monitoring past policy impacts. These
distinctions are by no means purely technical. Politically,
ex‐ante predictions may be less “threatening” to certain
actors than ex‐post assessments of what they have actu‐
ally (not) achieved (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2019).
In the cases reviewed in this article, there are recur‐
rent monitoring cycles, creating predictable monitoring
outputs. An innovation in the Energy Union governance
is that there are concrete prescriptions on Commission
assessments with a view to revising targets and instru‐
ments. Furthermore, the Monitoring Mechanism has
been closely aligned with effort sharing processes at the
EU level, another attempt to increase the consequential‐
ity of monitoring (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2020). This has
been done, in turn, as the EU has adjusted its own pol‐
icy cycles to the rhythm of the Paris Agreement. Putting
monitoring in sync with policymaking may increase the
effectiveness of the former. Taken together, there is
a clear trend towards better alignment of monitoring
processes with policymaking in various substantial pol‐
icy areas.
One challenge of the EGD and the associated legisla‐
tion is that they contain long‐term targets (e.g., carbon
neutrality) and concepts (such as justice and fairness),
which require profound change, including far‐reaching
social change. Aspects such as social justice or resilience
are difficult to capture with single indicators to assess
progress against targets. A broad range of indicators,
combined with qualitative evidence, will likely be neces‐
sary for a more comprehensive and continuous assess‐
ment over time. The link with the SDGs and their indi‐
cators in the EGD is one promising aspect in terms of
monitoring progress (see Schoenefeld et al., in press).
2.5. To What Effect Do People Monitor?
While previous research has typically viewed monitor‐
ing as a tool to assess the effects of policies, emerg‐
ing work suggests that the existence and operation of
monitoring systems may have a range of potential polit‐
ical and substantial effects. For example, if monitoring
helps strengthen policy implementation or provides a
basis for revising governance targets, then substantial
effects may flow from it. Given that there are multiple
reasons why actors engage in policy monitoring, there is
no straightforward answer to what the potential political
and/or substantial effects may be, creating an important
need to investigate real‐world instances of policy moni‐
toring empirically. Relevant questions include: Does poli‐
cymaking become more transparent, do steering effects
emerge, and can we observe the more political ele‐
ments of policy monitoring? Importantly (and challeng‐
ingly), can we trace the (often implicitly assumed) causal
mechanisms running from the existence ofmonitoring to
observed impacts? There are in principlemultipleways in
which policy monitoringmay be conceptualised in empir‐
ical investigations: as an independent variable in order
to explain certain outcomes (essentially the rationale
above); as an explanatory tool in order to assess the exis‐
tence of other causal mechanisms running from policy
inputs to impacts (see Dunn, 2018, p. 255); as an inter‐
vening variable as part of another policy input‐impact
mechanism; or finally as a dependent variable that can
be explained with other, independent variables.
Considering the growing emphasis on monitoring
and review in the context of the EGD, Paris Agreement,
the EU Energy Union, and specific pieces of legisla‐
tion on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and the
Monitoring Mechanism (now incorporated in the Energy
Union Governance Regulation), there is certainly an
underlying assumption that these processes are or will
become important elements of effective climate gover‐
nance in turbulent environments. However, the extent
to which this assumption is true is an open empiri‐
cal question ripe for detailed exploration; some schol‐
ars, such as Puaschunder (2021), have raised doubts
about whether the existing monitoring regimes are suffi‐
cient for the EGD’s bold aims because they, for example,
omit consumption‐based emissions. Laurent (2020) has
pointed to the limitations of the existing indicators con‐
tained in the EGDand the need to thoroughly re‐think the
European Semester and key indicators contained therein.
So far, there are no structured empirical investi‐
gations that assess the effects of monitoring systems.
Some authors have warned that “[g]ood performance
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information on its own is not going to reform the public
sector” (Mayne & Zapico‐Goñi, 1997, p. 12). One could,
by extension, argue that good policy monitoring alone is
unlikely to put the world or the EU on track to achieve its
aims under the Paris Agreement. Waterman and Wood
(1993) have likewise cautioned that policy monitoring
should not be viewed as a panacea. Putting monitoring
in place could also generate desired or undesired side
effects, such as the empowerment of executive agencies
involved with monitoring activities in the EU (Jevnaker
& Saerbeck, 2019; Trondal, 2016). There is, in sum, no
reason to assume that policy monitoring will necessar‐
ily produce the desired effects, and thus a need for care‐
ful empirical analysis to trace the factors that may drive
impactful monitoring and what impacts it generates.
3. Conclusions and Future Directions
Practices of policy monitoring—which include pol‐
icy monitoring, reporting, and data evaluation—have
become evermore central in EU policy‐making, including
in the EGD. They have been presented as suitable tools
to address turbulent policymaking around and within
EU institutions, especially in the conflict‐prone area of
climate change and energy policy. Despite the growing
prominence of monitoring, so far scholars have by and
large neglected it—a gap that this article addressed by
proposing a newanalysis framework (based on Lasswell’s
early insights on politics) and by conducting a first plau‐
sibility probe. The novel framework is chiefly a tool
for analysing existing monitoring schemes, but it may
equally serve as a resource for practitioners seeking to
set upmonitoring schemes as itmakesmonitoring design
choices explicit (see also Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017).
The framework demonstrates that there are many dif‐
ferent potential variations of policy monitoring, which
emerge as unique combinations of design characteris‐
tics that include who monitors, what they monitor, why
they monitor, when they monitor, and with what effects.
The plausibility probe has demonstrated that the frame‐
work’s elements can be identified in the context of cli‐
mate policy in the EU and the emerging EGD.
The biggest unexplored issue relates to the effec‐
tiveness of monitoring. As a key element of the frame‐
work, the effects of policy monitoring in terms of
enabling steering, learning, and ultimately advancing cli‐
mate action under conditions of turbulence are a key
area for future research. Turbulence in EU climate and
energy governance has emerged as one of the drivers of
monitoring schemes, as other policy options have often
remained beyond reach. The extent to which monitoring
is, in turn, a suitable tool to govern turbulence remains
a key future research priority. Given the multiple design
options for monitoring schemes, particularly the connec‐
tion between different monitoring design options and
effective governance requires attention.
What implications emerge from these findings for
the EGD? The EGD builds on several existing monitor‐
ing provisions, thus representing a key empirical exam‐
ple where monitoring is being used to govern in turbu‐
lent times. It relies on the EU’smonitoringwithin existing
frameworks that have long been in existence, but which
have been enhanced in various ways, for example, in the
context of the Energy Union. Whether doing so is suffi‐
cient remains an open question—with a view to moni‐
toring the EGD, Puaschunder (2021, p. 5) argues that:
Difficulties include the observability of results over
time, a lack of bodies to measure grand‐scale world‐
wide projects aswell as the lack of systemic andobjec‐
tive examination criteria for not occurred risks as well
as multiple stakeholder channels to discuss.
For example, Laurent (2020) explains how a focus on ter‐
ritorial emissions (i.e., the approach of the Monitoring
Mechanism) ignores imported consumption‐based emis‐
sions, for which the existing monitoring regimes and
the EGD do not account, and whose omission paints
a skewed picture of the EU’s emissions reductions and
the impact of its climate policies. Governing with turbu‐
lence, in particular, requires a broad knowledge of the
impacts of the EGD, given the potential for the emer‐
gence of unexpected outcomes. Crucially, the efficacy of
these monitoring schemes is yet to be assessed, a key
gap that the proposed framework has highlighted. There
appears to be a tendency to integrate different moni‐
toring streams to generate overall assessment, as is the
case in the Energy Union reporting. The newGovernance
Regulation has also placed a stronger emphasis on
ex‐ante reporting, whose effect on “policy shaping,”
especially by the European Commission, remains a key
subject for future research (see Knodt & Ringel, 2018).
The new EGD monitoring efforts and the dashboard
could potentially generate new effects, especially when
monitoring happens across policy sectors rather than
on a sectoral basis, but it is too soon to tell while
the exact institutional design and monitoring provisions
remain unknown.
An additional effect of policy monitoring may be its
use in other policy evaluation exercises, that is, “careful
retrospective assessment of the merit, worth and value
of administration, output and outcome of government
interventions, which is intended to play a role in future,
practical action situations” (Vedung, 1997, p. 3). In con‐
trast to policy monitoring, policy evaluation is a broader
exercise, which often aims to assess the causal effect
of a policy, frequently drawing on programme theory.
In doing so, monitoring data may be a helpful ingredi‐
ent, but only to the extent that it is relevant to and
usable in policy evaluation. In the implementation of
the EGD, the question will ultimately be whether policy
monitoring ends up as a “paper tiger” (Niederberger &
Kimble, 2011) or whether it becomes one of the crucial
institutional conditions that help accelerate and steer
the much‐needed low‐carbon transition (Roberts et al.,
2018). As Patton (2021) argues, “the greatest danger for
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 370–379 376
evaluators in times of turbulence is not the turbulence—
it is to act with yesterday’s criteria.” Without a better
understanding of policy monitoring practices and their
effects, scholars and practitioners may well discover that
the devil of governing in turbulent governance environ‐
ments emerges through the details of monitoring.
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